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COMMENTARY
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST: A REACTION TO
PROFESSOR BANKS*
Stephen L. Carter**
Not long ago, the Soviet Union pledged that it would refrain from mak-
ing a first use of nuclear weapons-turning a conventional conflict into a
thermonuclear one-if the United States would commit a similar undertak-
ing.' To the surprise of almost no one, the United States declined this invi-
tation. American military strategists have long considered retention of the
''nuclear option" as crucial to the defense of Western Europe in the event of
invasion by a Warsaw Pact force that threatened to overwhelm its conven-
tionally armed opposition.2 American determination not to surrender this
option may be wise or foolish,3 but it remains a controversial cornerstone of
NATO defense policy.
In an age when no thinking person can help worrying about the possibil-
ity of nuclear holocaust, it is quite natural that some fears would come to
focus on the likelihood that the President of the United States-usually re-
ferred to as "one man" or "a single individual"-might, through a wrong
decision, be the one who decides to make the first use of nuclear weapons
and thus turns a conventional conflict into what might be the last war this
planet will ever suffer. In a society that, like ours, prides itself on the rule of
law, this debate on the morality of policy has been transformed (perhaps
inevitably) into one over the wisdom and constitutionality of legislation to
hold the President back.
This is the background against which Professor William C. Banks, in a
recent article in the Journal of Legislation, has argued that the Congress
possesses the power to forbid the President to order a first use of nuclear
weapons unless he first receives the permission of a special committee com-
* © 1986 by Stephen L. Carter.
** Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., Stanford University, 1976; J.D., Yale University, 1979.
1. Soviet Forswears Using A-Arms First, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1982, at 1, col. 3 (pledge made by
Brezhnev).
2. For a critical but quite readable history of this doctrine, see S. ZUCKERMAN, NUCLEAR ILLUSION
AND REALITY 59-78 (1982). Although the distinction is qualitative rather than quantitative, and
drawing a brightline is therefore impossible, it is useful to distinguish "first use"-the expenditure
of any nuclear weapon of any yield for any hostile purpose-from "first strike"-a pre-emptive
strategic attack aimed at crippling an adversary's ability to respond. Thus the detonation of single
atomic mine would be a first use of nuclear weapons, but it certainly would not constitute a first
strike.
3. Compare Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, 60
FOREIGN AFF. 753 (1982) (policy to maintain the first use option is foolish) with Kaiser, Leber,
Mertes & Schulze, Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1157 (1982)
(policy is wise).
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prising leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate.4 This propo-
sal, put forth by the Federation of American Scientists ten years ago and
recently revived,5 is aimed at limiting the likelihood that the United States
will be engulfed in nuclear war, or at least, preventing a single man and his




Professor Banks offers a three-part argument in support of the FAS pro-
posal, which was the subject of a recent conference at Airlie House, Vir-
ginia.7 First, he contends that the restriction on presidential first use
represents "a constitutionally permissible clarification" of congressional au-
thority.' Second, he maintains that the committee approval device is not a
legislative veto as the Supreme Court used the term in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,9 which struck down most forms of that
veto."1 Third, he argues that even if characterized as a veto, the approval
requirement does not possess "the formal constitutional defects" which led
to the Court's decision in Chadha."
My own conclusion that the FAS proposal would not likely survive con-
stitutional scrutiny is a matter of record,' 2 and I will not reprise it here. But
I do believe that Professor Banks' careful and scholarly argument deserves
a thoughtful and independent response. In this brief commentary, I will not
quarrel with his arguments on whether this clarification is constitutionally
permissible, although I think it is not, or on whether the committee ap-
proval device constitutes a veto, although I think quite clearly that it does. I
will instead focus on the last part of his argument, that even if characterized
as a veto, the FAS proposal suffers no formal constitutional defects. I be-
lieve that it does, not because of Chadha's conclusion on legislative vetoes,
but rather because the history and special nature of the congressional war
power prohibit its delegation to a committee empowered to do what the
FAS proposal would permit. The Congress should concern itself far more
that it has with the prevention of nuclear war, particularly through a more
careful scrutiny of the deployment of American armed forces and the pro-
curement of particular weapons systems, but this proposal is not a permissi-
ble means for reaching its quite admirable goal.
I recognize that the non-delegation doctrine is at once hoary and vener-
able, and probably generates on sight or hearing a well-justified skepticism.
To many lawyers, non-delegation is something that an activist Supreme
4. Banks, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: The Constitutional Role of a Congressional Leadership Com-
mittee, 13 J. LEGIS. 1 (1986).
5. See Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1984, at 94. Cf Miller, Nuclear
Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21 (1982) (suggesting that all uses of nuclear weap-
ons may be unconstitutional).
6. Stone, supra note 5, at 109-12.
7. The conference, entitled "First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who Decides?,"
was held at Airlie House on November 15-17, 1985.
8. Banks, supra note 4, at 4.
9. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
10. See Banks, supra note 4, at 3-4.
11. Id.
12. See S. Carter, Warmaking Under the Constitution and the First Use of Nuclear Weapons (unpub-
lished manuscript on file in the Journal of Legislation office).
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Court invented in order to gut the New Deal,13 or perhaps something that a
couple of Justices of another activist Supreme Court hope to use to gut the
modem administrative state that the New Deal and the Second World War
combined to spawn. 4 There is a form of non-delegation doctrine that per-
haps deserves that description, the form that insists that some decisions
require legislative discretion and therefore must be made by the
legislature. 5
My concern with delegation problems in the FAS proposal is, however,
somewhat narrower. That discretion is delegated is irrelevant. What does
matter is that the proposal would permit a handful of members of the Con-
gress to exercise an authority that quite possibly cannot be exercised at all;
but one which, if it can be exercised, was assigned by those who wrote and
ratified the Constitution to the Congress as a whole. As I will argue in the
following pages, because the FAS proposal permits a slice of the congres-
sional war power to be exercised instead by a delegate of the Congress-and
this is the net effect of the proposal-it does violence to the carefully crafted
system of checks and balances of which the shared warmaking authority
forms a part.
To understand the application of that doctrine to the facts at hand, it is
necessary first to follow the shape of congressional and presidential author-
ity to make war. The Constitution establishes the President as the Com-
mander-in-Chief,1 6 but reserves to the Congress the authority to declare
war, 17 to regulate the armed forces,'" and to provide for their support.' 9
Those who wrote and ratified the Constitution thought that this system ade-
quately provided for defense of the nation's interests while striking a bal-
ance that would not permit either the President or the Congress to decide
alone when to fight.
Over the nation's history, of course, things have not been quite so sim-
ple. The President has quite frequently decided alone when to fight, and not
always because foreign invaders forced the choice on him. He has done so
far more often than the Congress has; and if the Congress can be said to
have concurred, it has almost always been through appropriations bills or
mere silence.2 ° Indeed, while one of the nation's most tragic conflicts, the
13. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
14. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
15. Cf. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1693-97
(1975) (evaluating prospects for revival of the doctrine). United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), does suggest that even the New Deal Court contemplated a softer non-
delegation doctrine in the field of foreign affairs, but, as the Court's opinion there makes clear, only
when the delegate is the President of the United States, who possesses constitutional authority of
his own.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, see. 8, cl. 11.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 16.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cls. 12-13.
20. Students of the war power have compiled long lists of historical episodes in which the Congress has
acquiesced in presidential exercise of a broad discretion to commit American armed forces to battle
on his own initiative. See, e.g., L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT 284-99 (1985); W. REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
[Vol. 13:206
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Vietnam War, was justified by reference to a congressional resolution that
might well have constituted a declaration of war,2' the bloodiest conflict in
the nation's history, the Civil War, was never formally declared by the Con-
gress. The past two centuries have witnessed only a handful of formal decla-
rations by the Congress, but the Presidents have rarely hesitated to send
troops into battle when the Chief Executive's advisers have determined that
the nation's interests are at risk.
This history-along with panicky finger-pointing following popular dis-
enchantment with American participation in the war in Vietnam--con-
fronted the Congress when in 1973 it forced the War Powers Resolution on
a weakened President Nixon.22 I have never been fully persuaded of the
Resolution's wisdom, but I have few doubts about its constitutionality. I
have argued elsewhere that a court confronting the question would proba-
bly rule the Resolution constitutional, notwithstanding its extensive legisla-
tive veto provisions." This conclusion rests on my understanding of the
unique nature of the shared war power. Although the matter is controver-
sial, I will accept here the assumption shared by Professor Banks and most
of the writers in this area: The declaration clause was aimed at preventing
the nation from entering an offensive war without congressional consent.
24
In supporting the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, I further
argued that the Congress enjoys some discretion over the manner in which
it may exercise its declaration power, and that it may place procedural limi-
tations on presidential activities, as long as those limitations are aimed at
preserving for the Congress as a whole the power the Constitution seems to
contemplate.2 ' Thus, the power may be exercised either directly or through
a device that permits the requisite consent-or its failure-to be made
manifest.
But this consent must be the consent of the entire Congress, for under
the Constitution, that is the only consent that matters. No lesser or different
body can act in the legislature's stead, and no plan not providing a func-
tional equivalent of that consent should stand. The entire plan for sharing
the war power would be upset were the Congress entitled to delegate this
authority to declare war. The restrictions on presidential freedom contained
in the War Powers Resolution are constitutional under this theory because
they effectively prohibit the President from fighting an offensive war unless
the entire Congress, through majority votes in both Houses, manifests its
consent. 26 The FAS proposal provides for something entirely different.
CONGRESS 116-69 (1981); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 833, 851-70 (1972).
21. See Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution).
22. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982). For background on the adoption of the Resolution, see W. REVELEY III,
supra note 20, at 225-34; Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L.
REV., 101, 102-05 (1984).
23. Carter, supra note 22, at 116-33. The War Powers Resolution includes two relevant provisions that
might be characterized as legislative vetoes, section 5(b), requiring the President to withdraw
American armed forces from wherever he may have sent them if he does not receive congressional
permission within 60 days of their deployment, and section 5(c), requiring the President to with-
draw the forces immediately if the Congress so demanded through a concurrent resolution.
24. Banks, supra note 4, at 16.
25. Carter, supra note 22, at 116-28.
26. Id. at 116-26.
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Under the proposal, a committee of powerful members of the Congress, not
the Congress itself, would be authorized to grant or deny a presidential
request to make a first use of nuclear weapons.27 Functionally, then, it is the
committee that must make manifest the consent or lack of consent by the
Congress. 28 The only problem is that it is logically impossible for any com-
mittee other than a committee of the whole to do so. Even if unanimous, the
vote of the committee is only a vote of its members; it is not the consent or
refusal of consent of the Congress itself.
Thus, I fear that simply as a matter of constitutional structure, the argu-
ment pressed by Professor Banks fails. For no matter how strong his argu-
ment that the FAS proposal contemplates no veto, no matter how earnestly
he believes that there is no presentment difficulty, no matter how shrewdly
he makes the case that the President would otherwise be unfettered, the
proposal still founders on the requirements of bicameralism. Nothing in the
Constitution suspends that requirement when the Congress finds that emer-
gency conditions exist. Nor would it be wise to read the document that way.
"Emergency" has over time proved all too malleable a justification for
otherwise unconstitutional government action.29
In an effort to bolster his claim that the committee proposal furthers
rather than offends constitutional goals, Professor Banks appeals to the his-
tory of the Constitution's drafting and ratification. In his discussion of con-
stitutional history, Professor Banks writes:
It was the Executive, not Congress, whose potential for abuse of war power
was the subject of lively discussion at the convention and was examined in
the Federalist. The careful attention paid to the "declare war" language by
the Framers demonstrates their concern that the President's powers be
checked so that he would only be able to commit troops without a declara-
27. Banks, supra note 4, at 2-3. The FAS proposal provides that:
[i]n any given conflict or crisis, whatsoever, and notwithstanding any other authority, so
long as no nuclear weapons (or other weapons of mass destruction) have been used by
others, the President shall not use nuclear weapons without consulting with, and securing
the assent of a majority of, a committee composed of the:
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives
Majority and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives
Majority and Minority Leader of the Senate
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of:
Senate Committee on Armed Forces
House Committee on Armed Forces
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
House Committee on International Relations
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy....
Id. at 3. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy no longer exists. Id. at 3 n. 15.
28. At the Airlie House conference discussing the FAS proposal, one participant argued that the Presi-
dent would be able to obtain the consent or refusal of consent of the entire Congress through an
appeal of the crisis committee's vote. The potential availability of this procedure is beside the point.
Even if the President is able to take an appeal, the basic problem remains unchanged: It is an act of
the committee and not of the Congress as a whole that has prevented the President from acting in
the first place.
29. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (sustaining the exclusion of persons of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area during World War II). For a detailed analysis of
how the concept of urgency and deference led the Court astray in Korematsu and its companion
cases, see Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). The shoe,
moreover, may be on the other foot: American tradition has recognized a broad (if controversial)
presidential war authority in the event of emergency. See L. FISHER, supra note 20, at 287-92, 299-
318.
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tion of war in response to "sudden attacks.",30
This encapsulation is only partly accurate. Madison's fragmentary notes of
the Convention contain only a tiny amount concerning the reasons for the
adoption of an amendment changing "make war"-the power granted the
Congress under the Articles of Confederation and in early drafts of the
Constitution-to "declare war."'" That this was done to leave the President
free to respond to sudden attacks is a popular bit of mythology without
significant support in constitutional language or history.
The lack of support in language is the more important difficulty. At the
time the Constitution was adopted, a declaration was not generally consid-
ered necessary before a sovereign state could engage in war. 32 To be sure,
the declaration carried with it important consequences for the law of na-
tions, but it had little to do with the freedom of the sovereign to fight.3 3 The
Constitution, however, established a divided sovereignty, and with it, a di-
vided war power. The congressional war power under the Articles involved
the conduct of the war. 34 The power to "declare war," which is all that was
left to the Congress in the Constitution, is quite difficult to read as involving
the conduct of all wars except when invasions must be repulsed. Yet that is
the reading popularly adopted on the basis of a few snippets of notes from
the Convention.
Professor Banks, like others who have written on this subject, places
considerable weight on the fact that Madison records the change as having
followed on the joint claim by Elbridge Gerry and Madison himself that the
President must be left free to respond to "sudden attacks" against the na-
tion.35 As an initial matter, it bears noting that extrapolation from the one
argument Madison happened to write down is unconvincing as a historical
methodology. Certainly the note-taker is most likely to take note of what he
himself has argued. That this is all he writes is no basis for assuming that
nothing else was said.
30. Banks, supra note 4, at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
31. Under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress was granted "the sole and exclusive right and
power of determining on peace and war." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, sec. 1. Accord-
ing to James Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention, the Committee on Detail pro-
posed to grant to the Congress the power to "make war." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 182 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as RECORDS]. After a
debate that was either remarkably brief or poorly recorded by Madison, the delegates deleted the
Committee's language and substituted the current congressional authority to "declare war." Id. at
318-19.
32. For useful historical background, see generally R. Turner, Congressional Limits on the President's
Conduct of National Security Policy: From the War Powers Resolution to the "No First Use"
Debate (unpublished manuscript delivered at Perspectives on Public Policy conference in Novem-
ber 1985 on file in the Journal of Legislation office).
33. As one proponent of ratification explained, the United States would be permitted under the Consti-
tution to maintain a standing army because otherwise "the government must declare war before
they are prepared to carry it on." See "Demosthenes Minor," in Gazette of the State of Georgia,
Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION 243, 246 (M. Jensen ed. 1978). In New York, an opponent of ratification argued against
the Constitution on precisely this ground. See "Cincinnatus III". To James Wilson, Esq., in New
York Journal, Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 14 id. at 124.
34. The language of the Articles of Confederation was always understood to permit the Congress to
dictate the conduct of the war. See A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER 15-25 (1976).
35. Banks, supra note 4, at 16.
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More to the point, Madison's report of the Convention on this issue, as
Charles Lofgren had noted, is at the very least suspect and may be substan-
tially in error. 16 After the Convention, Madison corrected many of his
notes, apparently on the basis of memory, but not his notes of the discussion
on the war power. 3 ' The key point is that Rufus King recommended chang-
ing the language not to leave the President free to respond to sudden at-
tacks, but because "making war" implied deciding on the means for the
conduct of the war, which was in his judgment an executive function. 38
According to Madison's notes, the amendment passed overwhelmingly on
the first try, so King's argument might not have been relevant (although the
same might then be said for Madison's own "sudden attack" argument).
According to the official Journal of the Convention, however, the motion
initially failed, then was taken up again after King's remark, and this time
passed overwhelmingly.39 If the Journal is right, and Madison wrong, then
the amendment passed not on the sudden attack claim, but on the claim
that making war was an executive function. The Journal may of course be
wrong and Madison right-a peculiar though possible answer-but the best
that proponents of the "sudden attack" limitation can fairly claim is that
the reason for the change is not clearly revealed in the available records.
The other problem with this popular view of the history is that it ends at
the conclusion of the Philadelphia Convention; but the debates of the Con-
vention were secret, and if "We, the People" ever approved the new Consti-
tution, we-they--did so in the state ratification conventions.' Thus the
truly important discussion is surely that which occurred at the state level,
both in the conventions and, concurrently, in the popular press. From these
subsequent proceedings, Professor Banks selects for quotation two com-
ments by James Wilson. The first is his concern that "no man, or a single
body of men" be allowed to move the nation into war; the second is his
comment that "nothing but our national interest can draw us into war. '41
The committee proposal, Professor Banks argues, will further these objec-
tives-objectives which he ascribes not to Wilson alone, but to the Framers
generally.
4 2
But Wilson said more in his speech about the war power, and what he
said deserves to be quoted at greater length. He was not merely urging that
no individual or group be permitted to involve the nation in war; he argued
instead that the constitutional system "is calculated to guard against" this
danger, because "the important power of declaring war is vested in the leg-
islature at large" and "must be made with the concurrence of the House of
36. See Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672,
675-77 (1972).
37. Id. at 676 n.17.
38. 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 318-19.
39. Lofgren, supra note 36, at 676-77. For a further detailed discussion of this question, a crucial one
for those who believe they have isolated in this debate an "original understanding," see W.
REVELEY III, supra note 20, at 82-85.
40. Cf Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discover the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (discuss-
ing the significance of the opening words of the Preamble).
41. Banks, supra note 4, at 17.
42. Id.
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Representatives. ' 43 From this requirement of full legislative participation,
Wilson then concluded that "nothing but our national interest can draw us
into war."" The genius of the system, in other words, was for Wilson the
rule that the legislature alone and the legislature as a whole would hold the
power to declare an offensive war. The committee proposal runs counter to
this understanding.
Nor was Wilson alone in his view on the nature of the Constitution's
protection against a runaway President. Again and again, in The Federalist,
in the popular press, in the ratification conventions, supporters of the Con-
stitution responded to complaints of presidential strength by asserting that
the legislature alone might declare war and had further authority to restrict
the President's use of the armed forces.45 The role of the House was particu-
larly emphasized, for many feared that the President and a small group of
backers, most likely from the Senate, would be able to do as they pleased.46
The original understanding, in short, was of plenary legislative considera-
tion of offensive warmaking. The crisis committee proposed by FAS estab-
lishes precisely the sort of privy council warmaking of which the Framers
were greatly afraid.47
But if those who approved the Constitution were afraid of warmaking
by a small group-so the argument might run-is not independent presi-
dential warmaking even worse? The answer is partly "yes" and partly "no"
and rests, once more, on a consideration of the war power as a whole. The
Framers plainly did not envision a system in which a single individual could
fight any war of his choosing at any time of his choosing. Over the last two
centuries, many Presidents have felt themselves free to do precisely that.
This perception of freedom reflects no failure in the Constitution, however;
at worst, it reflects a failure of congressional will.
The Constitution provides the means for congressional disapproval and
prohibition of American participation in foreign adventures. The Congress
may always cut off funds. It may place restrictions on the activity of Ameri-
can armed forces and require the President to obtain its permission through
a statutory amendment if he wants to use them in some contrary manner.
And it may establish a veto on presidential activity, as it has in the War
Powers Resolution, as long as the veto requires majority votes of both
Houses, thereby manifesting a refusal by the Congress to consent to the
President's war.48
43. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 528 (J. Elliot ed. 1936) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES].
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (A. Hamilton); 4 DEBATES, supra note 43, at 107-08 (Iredell); 4
id. at 287 (Pinckney).
46. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 43, at 233 (Marshall).
47. For this reason, Edmund Randolph opposed granting the Senate any role in the decision whether
to go to war. 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 278-79. The fear of the President acting in concert with
the Senate, which was expected to remain relatively small, recurred during the ratification debates.
See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 43, at 491 (W. Grayson) (President and Senate will be "partners
in crime"); 3 id. at 498 (J. Monroe) (the Senate is no more than the President's "own council").
48. Warmaking is not, of course, the only area in which the Congress, in its rush to participate in the
day-to-day making of policy, often ignores the possibility of indirect checks on the exercise of
presidential power. See Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presiden-
tial Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1384-94 (1983).
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Little of this would be effective, of course, in "micromanaging" the
President's choice of particular weapons systems in any particular conflict.
Yet the change in constitutional language from "make" to "declare"
strongly suggests that nobody thought micromanagement of that nature
was an appropriate congressional role. Thus if other mechanisms for per-
mitting the Congress to play a direct role in approving the expenditure of
particular weapons seem awkward or unworkable, this may simply be evi-
dence that the system cannot be adapted to that purpose. The Congress can
and should decide whether the nation will fight and-on the theory I have
pressed-whether the nation should stop. But once the battle is joined, the
Constitution surely leaves the choice of weapons to the President.49
There are ways, of course, for the Congress to play a role in weapons
selection without exceeding the proper scope of its authority. The Congress
might prohibit any use of nuclear arms (except to respond to nuclear at-
tack) without congressional permission. That might prove unwieldy and un-
wise, and if so, would simply illustrate once more the wisdom of those who
structured the war power. Or the Congress might impose rules governing
the particular set of circumstances in which nuclear weapons should be
used. Naturally, not every contingency could be anticipated, and such a rule
might be more a hindrance than a help to national security. Finally, the
Congress might decline to authorize the purchase of weapons systems it
does not want the President to use. If this instrument seems too blunt, then
perhaps the Congress ought to do none of these things, and ought instead to
acknowledge the fact that we live under a Constitution that makes plain
who is the Commander-in-Chief.
Micromanagement is probably a mistake. The Congress might do better
to take more seriously its role in appropriating money and making rules to
regulate the armed forces, thus being more certain that the weapons the
nation possesses are the weapons that it needs and that the places where
American troops are at risk are the places where the nation's security de-
mands that they be. These policy choices are not easy ones, but they are the
essence of legislation. A legislature is not constructed for deep involvement
in crises as they develop, and in particular, cannot easily play an important
role in decisions on the particular tactics to be used in a given conflict. For
the legislature to restructure itself to take on these essentially executive
tasks, as Rufus King might have called them, really is to insist that nobody
look at the forest and everybody count the trees. And those who hold never-
theless that counting the trees is what really matters should bear in mind
Justice Jackson's admonition in The Steel Seizure Case on the nature of
power in the federal system: "[O]nly Congress itself can prevent power
from slipping through its fingers."" ° If the Congress grows obsessed with
the trees, then the President will plan the forests. A Congress that seeks to
49. Obviously, this choice would be only from among the weapons that the Congress, either through
legislative action or through implication, has authorized the President to use. I would make no
claim (although I believe that there are some who would) that the President as Commander-in-
Chief has the right to order the purchase of weapons the use of which the Congress has expressly
forbidden.
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
[Vol. 13:206
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exercise executive authority should profess no surprise if the legislative
power is in its turn adopted by the President.
The FAS proposal for a crisis committee is a well-intentioned suggestion
for dealing with a problem less tractable than most of us wish. But there is
no means both constitutional and convenient through which the Congress
can share the first-use decision with the President. The Congress possesses
an enormous residuum of power that might be used in channeling presiden-
tial discretion and in taking other steps to make nuclear war less likely, and
deeper congressional involvement in the setting of the war policy of the
United States is a sensible course. Setting policy, however, is not the same
as implementing it, and the FAS proposal encourages the latter at the ex-
pense of the former. Its approach is a mistake, and an unconstitutional one
at that.
